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GM crop technology and trade restraints:
economic implications for Australia
and New Zealand∗
Kym Anderson and Lee Ann Jackson†
How much might the potential economic beneﬁt from enhanced farm productivity
associated with crop biotechnology adoption by Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) be
offset by a loss of market access abroad for crops that may contain genetically modiﬁed
(GM) organisms? This paper uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model
to estimate effects of other countries’ GM policies without and with ANZ farmers
adopting GM varieties of various grains and oilseeds. The gross economic beneﬁts to
ANZ from adopting GM crops under a variety of scenarios could be positive even if
the strict controls on imports from GM-adopting countries by the European Union are
maintained, but not if North-East Asia also applied such trade restaints. From those
gross economic effects would need to be subtracted society’s evaluation of any new food
safety concerns and negative environmental externalities (net of any new environmental
and occupational health beneﬁts), as well as any extra costs of segregation, identity
preservation and consumer search.
Key words: biotechnology, computable general equilibrium, genetically modiﬁed organisms,
regulation, trade policy.
1. Introduction
Genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMO) are the focus of much attention in world
food markets. GM food crop technology is claimed to have great potential for the
world’s farmers and ultimately consumers, following initial success with GM cotton
varieties. Beneﬁts for farmers could include greater productivity and less occupational
health and environmental damage (e.g., through less use of pesticides), while beneﬁts
to consumers include lower food prices and, potentially, enhanced attributes (e.g.,
‘nutriceuticals’, more varieties and qualities). Despite those potential beneﬁts, GMOs
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areattractingahighdegreeofattentionamongsomeconsumerandcommunitygroups
concerned about the potentially adverse impacts on food safety (e.g., ‘Will they cause
cancer?’), on the environment (e.g., ‘Will they lead to pesticide-resistant superweeds?’)
and on foreign control of seeds (e.g., ‘Will we end up with just a handful of crop
varieties supplied by even fewer multinational seed ﬁrms?’). Producers and consumers
preferring to stay with conventional varieties also worry about the cost to them of
preserving the GM-free identity of those varieties.
Numerous governments are responding to those concerns, typically in conservative,
command-and-control ways such as placing a moratorium on the production, use and
therefore importation of products containing GMOs (as the European Union (EU)
did de facto between 1998 and 2004) or, in cases where permission is granted to grow
or sell certain GM crop varieties, mandating strict GMO labelling laws that necessitate
expensive segregation and identity preservation (SIP) systems to be used throughout
the supply chain (as the EU imposed in April 2004 as a replacement for its de facto
moratorium).
Althoughmaize,soybeansandcanolahaveattractedthemostattentionintheglobal
debate about GM crops due to their prevalence in USA, Canadian and Argentinian
production, scientists have genetically modiﬁed other food crops too, including wheat
and rice, that are far more important to Australia.
Inthisatmosphere,exportersoffoodproductsfearthatcustomersinfood-importing
countries will discount or refuse to buy their products, if even a subset of the export-
ing country’s farmers adopt GM technology. The experience in the 3years following
October 1998 when the EU imposed its de facto moratorium seemed to vindicate
that concern because the USA’s share of the EU’s maize imports fell to virtually zero
(from around two-thirds in the mid-1990s), as did Canada’s share of EU canola im-
ports (from 54% in the mid-1990s; Anderson and Jackson 2005a, table 9). Therefore,
although these GM-adopting countries apparently have beneﬁted in terms of lower
production costs, they initially lost market share to GM-free suppliers, including to
Australia in the case of canola.
Food-exporting countries such as Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) thus need
to weigh the potential economic (and environmental) beneﬁts from biotechnology
development against any negative environmental risks associated with producing GM
crops, any additional costs of SIP through the supply chain so as to avoid adventitious
(accidental) presence of GM varieties in non-GM shipments and to allow consumers
to choose between foods with and without GMOs, any discounting and/or loss of
market access abroad for conventional counterparts to those speciﬁc crops which may
contain GMOs, and any discounting and/or loss of market access abroad for other
farm products because of what GM adoption does for ANZ’s generic reputation as a
‘clean, green and safe food’ producer.
Pending rigorous analysis of those issues, health ministers in Australia and New
Zealand have agreed to err on the side of precaution and introduce strict regulations
concerningGMOs.Asfrommid-2001,FoodStandardsAustraliaNewZealandrequire
that GM foods cannot be supplied to the domestic market unless approved (20 had
beenapprovedasatAugust2001),andmandatorylabellingisrequiredforallapproved
GM foods including processing aids (but not animal feeds) that contain GM protein
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or DNA or that have altered characteristics. This is one of the most stringent food
safety regimes in the world outside the EU, which means that satisfying domestic sales
requirements makes it possible for ANZ exporters to satisfy most other countries’
requirements (even though different labels will be required for different markets). On
the production side there are strict controls too. By mid-2004, Australia had approved
GM production only for canola (just two varieties), in addition to some GM varieties
of cotton and carnation ﬂowers. However, like New Zealand, state governments in
Australia have imposed moratoria on GM food crop production in their jurisdiction.
Todatetherehavebeenfewgeneralequilibriumsimulationanalysesoftheeconomic
beneﬁts and costs to ANZ farmers and the economy generally of GM policies not
just at home but also abroad. Partial equilibrium studies of adoption at home have
been undertaken by Foster (2001) for GM canola and wheat in Australia and by
Saunders and Cagatay (2003) for four products in New Zealand, and Stone etal.
(2002) provide a general equilibrium analysis (using the GTAP model) for GM coarse
grains and oilseeds adoption in Australia. The present study builds on those earlier
studies in several respects: among other things, it uses the same general equilibrium
GTAP model as Stone etal. (2002) but a more recent version of the GTAP database,
and it examines a wider range of GM-adopting countries and of policy responses; it
examinesnotjustcoarsegrainsandoilseedsbutalsoprospectiveGMversionsofwheat
and rice (to provide a partial estimate of the opportunity cost of not approving their
commercial release); and it examines within the same modelling framework the effects
on both Australia and New Zealand without and then with them adopting GM crop
varieties.
The next section of the paper provides details of what the GTAP model of the
global economy can and cannot do in exploring the production, trade, price and
national economic welfare effects of GM technology and trade measures. Results are
presented in section 3 for a range of scenarios that vary by GM crop type, the set of
adopting countries and various policy responses to GM technologies. Key caveats are
discussed in section 4 before drawing out policy implications for Australia and New
Zealand in the ﬁnal section.
2. Global Trade Analysis Project model and modiﬁcations
The GTAP model of the global economy is used to provide insights into the effects
of GMO technology adoption in some sets of countries without and then with trade
policy responses in two other sets of countries. See Hertel (1997) for comprehensive
modeldocumentationoftheGTAPmodel,whichisaneoclassicalmultiregional,static,
applied general equilibrium model that assumes perfect competition, constant returns
to scale and full employment of all factors of production. Version 5.4 of the GTAP
database (see Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) is used for these applications. It draws
on global economic structures and trade ﬂows of 1997, just before the de facto EU
moratorium. The GTAP model has been aggregated to depict the global economy as
having 17 regions (to highlight the main participants in the GM debate) and 14 sectors
(with the focus on the primary agricultural sectors affected by the GM debate and
their related processing industries).




of GM and non-GM products as intermediate inputs into ﬁnal consumable food.
Our economy-wide GTAP model does not include environmental externalities, so
the welfare consequences of any such externalities are not measured. This unfortunate
situation is a result of the uncertainty surrounding the relationships among various
economic and environmental variables. What can be said, though, is that the net
environmental effects of producing GM crops could be positive or negative – just
as they could be for producing non-GM crops, which are also not captured in our
model. Many GM crop varieties have some attributes that are more environmentally
friendly than their conventional non-GM counterparts. They are also less dangerous
to farmers and the soil where they require reduced applications of pesticides. However,
there is concern that some long-term and possibly irreversible negative environmental
effects might occur in the future – although a recent comprehensive report to the
UK Government by a high-level scientiﬁc committee could not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
evidence of such adverse effects, nor reasons to expect they will emerge (King 2003).
Federoff and Brown (2004) give reasons why that null ﬁnding is not surprising from
the viewpoint of a molecular biologist.
The welfare calculus in the GTAP model, as in all such models, is also unable to
valuethewelfareimpactsofconsumers’imaginedriskineatingfoodsthatmaycontain
GMOs. The model’s incapacity to include this, as the above-mentioned production
externalities,isastandardlimitationofcomputablegeneralequilibrium(CGE)models
used for trade analysis. It affects the interpretation of the welfare results: they provide
a measure of the opportunity cost of not deregulating, which society can then weigh
against its subjective valuation of avoiding real or imagined externalities and risks
(plus the cost of any research needed to adapt available GM technology to suit ANZ
conditions and of preserving the identity of non-GM varieties, net of any recovery of
those costs).
2.1 Production
The GTAP simulations reported below recognise the potential for varied national
adoption of GM crops. Weassume 45percent of USA and Canadian coarse grain pro-
duction is GM (reﬂecting its share in 2003), while Latin American countries, Australia
and New Zealand, if they adopt, are assumed to adopt GM coarse grains at two-thirds
the level of the USA (i.e., 30% of their coarse grain production is GM) and all other
countriesareassumedtoadoptGMcoarsegrainsatone-thirdthelevelofUSadoption
(i.e., 15% of their coarse grain production is GM). The latter assumptions reﬂect the
facts that maize, soybean and canola are smaller shares of coarse grain and oilseed
production in the countries yet to adopt GM varieties, and that the smaller plot size of
ﬁelds in all but Australia make the technology less cost-effective because more buffer
zoning is required per hectare of GM crop in densely farmed regions. Similarly, we
also assume that 75percent of oilseed production in the USA, Argentina and Brazil
is GM, while Canada, other Latin American countries, Australia and New Zealand
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adopt at two-thirds the extent of the major adopters and the remaining regions adopt
at one-third the extent of the major adopters. These and the following base-case as-
sumptions are arrived at by drawing from a variety of sources including the European
Commission (2001) and James (2004).
For rice, major prospective adopters including the USA, China, India and all other
Asian countries are assumed to produce 45percent of their crop using GM technolo-
gies (the same share as GM coarse grain in adopting countries). All other regions,
being less rice-intensive, are assumed to adopt at two-thirds this rate (i.e., 30% of their
rice crop is GM). GM wheat adoption is assumed to occur to the same extents as
assumed for coarse grain adoption in the various regions.
For all four products, the above GM/non-GM proportions assumed to apply to
production are assumed to apply also to the other initial relationships in the model’s
database, such as consumption, intermediate input use, exports and imports.
Having established that initial disaggregation, the model is then used to calculate
the effects of output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral farm productivity shocks on the GM
crops. Marra etal. (2002) present empirical evidence on the positive impacts on yields
and proﬁts from adopting GM crop varieties. Following Stone etal. (2002), our model
simulations assume that total factor productivity is higher for GM than for non-GM
varieties by 6percent for oilseeds and 7.5percent for coarse grains; in the prospective
cases of rice and wheat, a conservative 5percent difference is assumed. However,
because our sensitivity analysis shows that it makes little difference to the results (see
appendix to Anderson and Jackson 2005b), we follow Nielsen and Anderson (2001)
and Anderson etal. (2002) in assuming that GM technology uniformly reduces the
level of primary factors needed per unit of output. This alters the mix of GM and
non-GM varieties demanded by consumers (see section 2.2).
Some earlier studies have assumed GM adoption requires the introduction of SIP
systems, and have suggested their cost could amount to as much as 15percent of
the farm-gate price of the GM product (e.g., Burton etal. 2002). These costs would
be spread along the value chain (see details in Bullock and Desquilbet 2002) and so
shared between producers and consumers, including for non-GM varieties; and the
ﬁxed cost of their introduction would be amortised. We expect in the steady state that
the annual cost would be very small, bearing in mind that SIP systems are not new and
arebecomingmorecommonasconsumersdemandever-greaterproductdifferentiation
by variety, by quality (for various food safety and environmental reasons) and by place
and method of production (Lin etal. 2000; Wilson and Dahl 2005). Therefore, we do
not include an additional segregation cost in our analysis.
2.2 Structure of intermediate and ﬁnal household demand
Because consumers’ knowledge and acceptance of GM foods varies around the world
(JamesandBurton2003),wealterthetraditionalGTAPdemandstructure.TheGTAP
model uses a single representative household structure to capture demand effects in
each region. In the absence of household differentiation by, for example, GM aver-
sion, the representative household consumes a bundle of products which always in-
cludes both GM and non-GM products when both are available. We modiﬁed the
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consumption module of the GTAP model to include a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) nesting of GM and non-GM crops. The representative household
chooses ﬁrst between GM and non-GM products, and then between imported and
domestic products. Elasticities of substitution in that ﬁrst consumption choice, be-
tween GM and non-GM varieties of each product, are set reasonably high at 5 in the
current GM-adopting countries and in developing countries (where there is little or
no SIP), but at 3 in Australia and New Zealand where consumers are more averse
to GM foods, and at just 1 in the EU. However, the model structure does not allow
us to calculate the loss in welfare to GM-averse consumers who, due to lack of seg-
regation, are denied the choice of consuming non-GM varieties, if GM varieties are
allowed in the supply chain. These elasticities alter the proportions of GM and non-
GM varieties contained in the composite good and consumed by the representative
household but, because the model does not allow segregation, the household demand
is expressed as demand simply for a composite good. After choosing the proportion
of GM goods in its composite bundle of a particular product such as rice, the house-
hold then chooses its preferred proportion of domestic and imported rice. This second
consumption choice is governed by the traditional Armington elasticities in the GTAP
model.
In the case of intermediate goods producers, such as in the feedmix-livestock in-
dustry, they are assumed to choose ﬁrst between domestic and imported feedstuffs
inputs and then between GM and non-GM varieties of the crops concerned. The elas-
ticities of substitution among domestic and imported feed grains or oilseeds are the
traditional Armington elasticities. The substitution between the GM and non-GM
composite tradables is then determined by the elasticities of substitution among these
two varieties, and this contributes to altering the quantities of the GM and non-GM
varieties produced away from the initial subdivision of the GTAP model’s data into
those two groups (described in section 2.1). The ﬁnal output is produced by combining
all other intermediate inputs with the GM/non-GM composite input, according to a
Leontief production function.
2.3 Simulations
The simulations reported below are selected from many possibilities to show how
different combinations of crop choice, country adoption and policy responses alter
economic impacts of GM technologies. Three sets of crop adoption scenarios are
considered. The core set, involving just coarse grain and oilseeds for current adopters
plus ANZ, is followed by two variations on the core simulations. One is optimistic
about the acceptance of GMOs, as it adds extra GM crops and adopting countries.
Theotherispessimistic,asitconsiderstheconsequenceofaspreadtoNorth-EastAsia
oftheEU’spolicyofeffectivelybanningimportsfromGM-adoptingcountries.TheEU
moratorium is modelled because the EU is still by far the biggest restrictor of products
that may contain GMOs even though it adopted a strict labelling requirement in place
of the de facto moratorium in April 2004; and China is included in the North-East
Asia moratorium scenario because it had imposed a GM-motivated import restriction
on US soybean in 2001 (since relaxed after intense US lobbying).
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The ﬁrst or core set of simulations examines the implications of adoption of GM
coarse grains and oilseeds by the USA, Canada and Argentina without and with ANZ
also adopting, and without and with an EU moratorium. Although the GTAP model
does not disaggregate down to maize, soybean and canola, these three account for
mostofthecoarsegrainandoilseedproductioninthecurrentGM-adoptingcountries.
These three crops are less dominant in Australia and New Zealand, therefore, further
investment in adaptive biotechnology research on other coarse grains and oilseeds
for ANZ conditions would be required to achieve the same productivity increase in
ANZ as in the USA (the cost of which is not included in what follows), which is why
we assume only two-thirds the extent of adoption for ANZ as for the ﬁrst-adopting
countries.
These scenarios are then compared to the scenario where all countries of the world
adopt GM varieties of these crops, to get an idea of the gross global economic beneﬁts
foregone annually because of the reluctance in the EU and elsewhere to embrace this
new technology – or, in other words, of the opportunity cost of precaution as practised
by those non-adopting countries (Simulations 1a–1e).
GM varieties have been developed for the world’s other two major food crops, rice
and wheat, to the point where their commercial release would quickly follow if there
wasadecisionbymajorgovernmentstoapprovethemandtherewassufﬁcientevidence
that consumers would be willing to buy foods produced with them. The most likely
place where those changes might occur is in China, where the government appeared
close to reaching an approval decision in 2005 but has again deferred the matter for
another year. India is also very actively examining the issue, and would likely soon
follow a positive decision by China. The USA and Argentina may well then join in.
We therefore ran a second set of simulations to examine the impact of adding GM
rice and wheat adoption in North America and Argentina to their adoption of coarse
grains and oilseeds, together with China and India also adopting GM varieties of all
four groups of crops. Paralleling the ﬁrst set of simulations, there are ﬁve scenarios in
this set too: adoption without and with ANZ also adopting, and without and with an
EU moratorium, plus one with all countries of the world adopting GM varieties of
these crops (Simulations 2a–2e).
The other variant on the ﬁrst set of simulations recognises that the EU policy
is tempting other countries to adopt a similar approach to GM food products. A
pessimistic scenario from the viewpoint of GM adopters would involve an import
moratorium also in North-East Asia. In the third set of simulations we therefore
examine the impact of GM adoption of just coarse grains and oilseeds in North
America and Argentina in the presence of a GM import moratorium by not only the
EU but also China, Japan and South Korea. Again that is run ﬁrst without and then
with ANZ adopting GM varieties of those crops. This pair of scenarios highlights the
trade-off for ANZ producers and governments between productivity growth by means
of GM adoption and the beneﬁts of remaining GM-free given actual EU and (in this
case)assumedNorth-EastAsianreluctancetoimportcropsproducedinGM-adopting
countries (Simulations 3a and 3b).
These simulations, summarised in Table 1, are clearly only a small subset of possible
simulations, but they illustrate major issues relevant to ANZ.
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3. Results
3.1 Quantity and price effects
To examine the impacts of these various adoption patterns on ANZ agricultural sec-
tors, Table 2 reports the production, price and trade impacts of USA, Canada and
Argentina adopting GM varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds without and with the
EU moratorium, alongside the same scenarios but with ANZ also adopting those GM
varieties (columns 1 and 2 vs columns 3 and 4).
These quantity and price effects resulting from the productivity shock are shown for
the weighted average for GM and non-GM varieties, as well as for their component
parts – but keep in mind that, in the absence of segmented markets, prices for these
varieties are implicit. (On the complexities of modelling the two varieties with SIP even
in partial equilibrium, see Sobolevsky etal. 2005.)
If ANZ choose not to adopt GM varieties, and there was no EU moratorium,
Australia’s production and net exports of not only coarse grains and oilseeds but also
of meat (and other livestock) products fall, because domestic prices of these products
are lowered by the greater competition resulting from the technology shock in the
USA (column 1 of Table 2). The same is true for New Zealand, although with smaller
ordersofmagnitude(showninparenthesesinTable2).TheEU,however,hasrestricted
imports of most coarse grain and oilseeds from North America and Argentina because
oftheirGMcontent,providinggreateropportunitiesforANZandotherfoodexporters
to supply European markets. When modelled as a ban, that reduces the extent of the
reduction in Australian production and net exports of these products but it does not
eliminatethenegativeeffectofgreatercompetitionfromGMadoptersabroad.Evenfor
New Zealand, it is barely sufﬁcient to neutralise the production effect of GM adoption
abroad because the large percentage export effect is very small in dollar terms (column
2 of Table 2).
IfANZweretochoosetojointheGMadopters,Australiancoarsegrainproduction
would expand instead of contracting and, if there were no EU moratorium, oilseed
production would fall much less. Lower domestic prices for these products induce
increasesindomesticconsumptionbutthoseincreaseswouldnotbeenoughtoprevent
coarse grain net export earnings from rising instead of falling (compare columns 1 and
3 of Table 2). Oilseed net exports would fall less in the absence of an EU moratorium
but not in its presence, should Australia adopt GM varieties not approved in the EU
(see second-last row of Table 2).
3.2 National trade balance and net welfare effects
The effect on the aggregate trade balance is positive for ANZ in the absence of the
EU moratorium and negative in its presence, in line with the sign of the net impact
of the productivity growth and policy response on the global economy. The reduction
in that trade balance from adopting GM coarse grain and oilseed varieties would be
small,however,nomorethan$US2millionperyearforAustraliaandlessthan$US0.5
million for New Zealand, without or with the EU moratorium (compare columns 1
and 3 or columns 2 and 4 of the ﬁrst two rows of Table 3).
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Table 2 Australian (and New Zealand)† production, price and trade impacts, under various
genetically modiﬁed (GM) adoption and policy response scenarios (percentage changes,
weighted average of GM and GM-free varieties)
USA, CAN USA, CAN, ARG
and ARG adopt and ANZ adopt
(and no With EU (and no With EU
import bans) moratorium import bans) moratorium
Simulation 1a Simulation 1b Simulation 1c Simulation 1d
Production volume
Total coarse grains −0.2 (−0.2) −0.1 (0.0) 0.4 0.2
Non-GM coarse grains −0.1 (−0.1) 0.0 (0.0) −0.8 −1.0
GM coarse grains −0.5 (−0.2) −0.4 (−0.0) 3.1 2.9
Total oilseeds −3.2 (−0.6) −2.3 (0.2) −0.8 −3.7
Non-GM oilseeds −0.8 (−0.2) −0.6 (0.4) −1.1 −3.8
GM oilseeds −5.5 (−1.0) −4.5 (0.0) −0.6 −3.5
Total meat products −0.1 (−0.2) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 −0.1
Domestic market prices
Total coarse grains −0.1 (−0.0) −0.1 (−0.0) −1.2 −1.2
Non-GM coarse grains −0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (−0.0) −0.1 −0.1
GM coarse grains −0.1 (0.0) −0.0 (−0.0) −3.8 −3.8
Total oilseeds −0.1 (−0.0) −0.1 (−0.0) −1.0 −1.0
Non-GM oilseeds −0.1 (−0.0) 0.4 (−0.0) −0.1 −0.1
GM oilseeds −0.1 (−0.0) 0.0 (−0.0) −2.0 −2.0
Total meat products −0.0 (−0.0) −0.1 (−0.0) −0.1 −0.1
Import volume
Total coarse grains 7.0 (2.2) 8.0 (2.8) −4.5 −3.7
Non-GM coarse grains 0.1 (0.1) 0.5 (0.4) −0.9 −0.7
GM coarse grains 9.2 (7.2) 10.3 (8.2) −4.8 −3.9
Total oilseeds 6.7 (1.9) 8.1 (0.9) 2.7 3.8
Non-GM oilseeds 0.2 (−0.1) 1.07 (−1.4) −0.4 0.24
GM oilseeds 10.3 (4.8) 11.9 (4.4) 4.5 5.8
Total meat products 0.4 (0.7) 0.3 (1.3) 0.3 0.2
Export volume
Total coarse grains −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) 0.1 0.0
Non-GM coarse grains 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) −0.03 −0.2
GM coarse grains −0.5 (0.0) −0.4 (0.0) 1.1 0.9
Total oilseeds −2.6 (−0.2) −1.8 (0.4) −0.6 −3.0
Non-GM oilseeds −0.6 (0.0) −0.4 (0.3) −0.6 −3.2
GM oilseeds −4.5 (−0.3) −3.3 (0.5) −0.7 −3.4
Total meat products −0.1 (−0.2) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 0.0
†New Zealand percentage changes are shown in parentheses. Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation
results. ANZ, Australia and New Zealand; ARG, Argentina; CAN, Canada; EU, European Union.
The net economic welfare effects on ANZ and other countries for these scenarios
are summarised in the lower part of Table 3. GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption
by North America and Argentina beneﬁts those countries despite the deterioration in
their terms of trade (see Table 6) as a consequence of their expanded exports, although
less so (especially for Canada) in the case where the EU moratorium continues. The
EU and the rest of the world also would beneﬁt, by way of improved terms of trade,
except in the case of the EU moratorium, which raises EU domestic prices of farm
products and thereby attracts more resources into an already heavily protected EU





































Table 3 Trade balance and economic welfare effects of genetically modiﬁed (GM) coarse grain and oilseed adoption by various countries ($US million
per year)
USA, CAN and ARG adopt USA, CAN, ARG and ANZ adopt All countries adopt
(and no import bans) With EU moratorium (and no import bans) With EU moratorium (and no import bans)
Simulation 1a Simulation 1b Simulation 1c Simulation 1d Simulation 1e
Change in trade balance
Australia 8 −36 −55
New Zealand 2 −12 −12
Change in economic welfare (equivalent variation in income)
Australia −9 −47 1 02
New Zealand −52 −33 −5
Argentina 312 247 312 247 287
Canada 72 7 72 7 65
USA 939 628 939 627 897
EU-15 267 −3145 270 −3160 595
Rest of World 714 1029 730 1041 2207
World 2290 −1243 2325 −1226 4047
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farm sector. Australia is worse off if it does not adopt but better off if it does, the
difference for these commodities being (10−(−4)=) $US14 million per year in the
presenceoftheEUmoratoriumbut(7−(−9)=)$US16millionifthemoratoriumwere
to be removed. New Zealand’s measured economic welfare is higher with its adoption
too,by$US1–2millionperyear.GMadoptionbyNorthAmericaandArgentina(with
or without ANZ adopting) would beneﬁt the world as a whole by a substantial $US2.3
billion per year if the EU were to impose no barriers to imports of GM products. This
represents more than half of the gains that would come from the whole world adopting
GM varieties of these products ($US4.0 billion, see ﬁnal column and row of Table 3),
reﬂecting: (i) the fact that the adopters produce close to half the world’s coarse grain
and oilseed; and (ii) our assumption that the broadacre nature of production/large
farmsintheadoptingcountriesensuresGMcropswouldrepresentalargerproportion
of production there than in the rest of the world.
In the ﬁrst set of variations on the core simulations, wheat and rice are added to
the set of GM crops and China and India are included in the set of GM-adopting
countries. That lowers ANZ production, prices and net exports of coarse grain and
oilseeds even more than in the ﬁrst set of simulations (because of greater competition
from the expanded supply of wheat and rice), in addition to having negative effects
on ANZ wheat and rice markets. The net economic welfare effects of adding these
commodities and countries to the crop adoption set are non-trivial. Estimated global
economic welfare improves, if there are no trade policy responses, by $US4.3 billion
instead of $US2.3 billion per year (compare column 1 in Tables 3 and 4). The USA,
Canada and Argentina gain little extra, however, because their productivity gains are
almost offset by a worsening of their terms of trade (see Table 6) as a consequence of
their additional productivity and of extra global supplies following adoption in China
and India. When ANZ do not adopt GM varieties, Australia loses around twice as
much in this extended adoption scenario regardless of the EU policy stance while New
Zealand loses almost no more (since it produces almost no wheat and rice). If ANZ
adopt GM varieties of coarse grains, oilseeds, rice and wheat, Australian economic
welfare would improve more than in the coarse grain/oilseed adoption scenario in the
absence of the EU moratorium, while New Zealand’s would be no different (compare
columns 3 in Tables 3 and 4).
In the presence of the EU moratorium, however, Australia’s welfare would improve
less than in the coarse grain/oilseed adoption scenario (but still improve) while New
Zealand’s would improve more (compare columns 4 in Tables 3 and 4). The reason for
the difference between Australia and New Zealand in that latter comparison is because
of the lowered price of wheat and rice in international markets, which alters the terms
of trade negatively for Australia but slightly positively for New Zealand (see Table 6).
In other words, Australia would gain from joining the adopters of GM varieties of
these four crops even if the EU moratorium were to continue indeﬁnitely, provided the
value Australians place on any adverse environmental effects of GM production (net
of any positive environmental and farmer health effects such as from reduced pesticide
use) and on knowing they are consuming GM-free food is no more than $US7 per
capita per year, and less than 50 US cents per capita for New Zealand (assuming total
annual beneﬁts are spread equally among the population).





































Table 4 Trade balance and economic welfare effects of genetically modiﬁed (GM) coarse grain, oilseed, rice and wheat adoption by various countries
(equivalent variation in income, $US million)
USA, CAN, ARG, China and India adopt USA, CAN, ARG, China, India and ANZ adopt All countries adopt
(and no import bans) With EU moratorium (and no import bans) With EU moratorium (and no import bans)
Simulation 2a Simulation 2b Simulation 2c Simulation 2d Simulation 2e
Change in trade balance
Australia 11 −16 −46
New Zealand 3 −12 −22
Change in economic welfare (equivalent variation in income)
Australia −18 −10 10 5 −1
New Zealand −62 −36 −7
Argentina 350 285 350 285 312
Canada 83 −23 82 −25 63
USA 1045 754 1047 756 1041
China 841 833 851 842 899
India 669 654 671 656 669
EU-15 355 −4717 363 −4868 810
Rest of World 989 1330 1027 1376 3719
World 4308 −892 4398 −968 7506
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Table 5 Economic welfare effects of genetically modiﬁed (GM) coarse grain and oilseed adop-
tion by the USA, Canada and Argentina with EU and North-East Asia moratoria (equivalent
variation in income, $US million)
USA, CAN and ARG adopt USA, CAN, ARG and ANZ adopt
Simulation 3a Simulation 3b
Australia 96 −13






Japan and Korea −2552 −2645
Other Asia 117 143
Rest of World 1348 1444
World −4471 −4977
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results. ANZ, Australia and New Zealand; ARG, Argentina;
CAN, Canada.
The above results understate the impact of current EU policies on ANZ and
other countries because those policies have encouraged the adoption of GM trade
restrictions in other countries. What would be the impact if North-East Asian coun-
tries followed the policy example of the EU? This can be seen from Table 5, which
shows results from our third set of simulations in which the EU moratorium on
trade in GM coarse grains and oilseeds is extended to include China, Japan and
Korea. That broadening of the moratorium alters the incentives for Australia, but
not New Zealand, to adopt GM varieties (ﬁrst two rows of Table 5). The reasons
become clear in Table 6. Speciﬁcally, row 11 of Table 6 (Simulation 3a) shows that
the positive terms of trade impact Australia experiences by not adopting GM varieties
and thereby maintaining market access to these important markets ($US111 million)
dominatesthenegativeallocativeefﬁciencyimpact(−$US15million),resultinginanet
positive welfare outcome ($US96 million). If Australia chooses to adopt and thereby
loses access to not just European but also North-East Asian markets (Simulation 3b),
the negative terms of trade impact (−$US46 million) overshadows the potential
beneﬁts from technical change ($US17 million) and improved allocative efﬁciency
($US16 million) to yield a net loss of $US13 million per year (row 12 of Table 6). The
larger loss for China in this scenario is because Australia would be a major supplier
of coarse grain imports by China if North-East Asia were to cease buying from North
America, but that trade ceases in the scenario in which ANZ also adopts GM varieties.
The difference for Australia in this case between Simulations 3a and 3b (i.e.,
betweenadoptingandnotadoptinginthepresenceofabroadenedmoratorium)isthus
$US109 million per year. (Our unreported results show that one-ﬁfth of that differ-
ence is due to China, the rest to Japan and Korea.) For New Zealand, however, its
coarse grain and oilseed industries are too small for GM adoption there to make much
difference (compare the ﬁnal two rows of Table 6).
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Table 6 Decomposition of national economic welfare effects due to genetically modiﬁed (GM)
adoption under various simulations† (equivalent variation in income, $US million)
National economic welfare decomposition
Allocative Terms of Technical Total
efﬁciency impact trade impact change impact impact
Australia
Simulation 1a 2 −11 0 −9
Simulation1b 3 −60 −4
Simulation 1c 3 −16 20 7
Simulation 1d 5 −14 19 10
Simulation 1e 5 −22 19 2
Simulation 2a 4 −22 0 −18
Simulation 2b 6 −15 0 −10
Simulation 2c 4 −38 44 10
Simulation 2d 10 −48 43 5
Simulation 2e 8 −51 43 −1
Simulation 3a −15 111 0 96
Simulation 3b 16 −46 17 −13
New Zealand
Simulation 1a 0 −30 −5
Simulation 1b 01 0 2
Simulation 1c 0 −52 −3
Simulation 1d 01 2 3
Simulation 1e 0 −72 −5
Simulation 2a 0 −60 −6
Simulation 2b 02 0 2
Simulation 2c 0 −64 −3
Simulation 2d 11 4 6
Simulation 2e 0 −10 4 −7
Simulation 3a 21 20 1 4
Simulation 3b 11 42 1 6
†See Tables 3–5 for the descriptions of each of the simulations. The welfare decomposition follows Huff
and Hertel (2000). Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
Inshort,theestimatedgrosspay-offtoANZfromGMadoptionispositiveintheﬁrst
two sets of scenarios (the second involving GM adoption by two more large countries
and two more crops than is currently the case), but smaller in the presence of the EU
restriction on imports. Moreover, if the EU’s stance were to encourage North-East
Asia also to adopt a moratorium on imports from GM-adopting countries, the pay-off
to ANZ from adopting could switch to slightly negative. The net pay-off in terms of
national welfare is more likely to be negative, the larger the valuation society places
on any perceived adverse environmental and consumer health consequences of GM
adoption net of positive environmental and occupational health beneﬁts associated
with producing GM as compared with non-GM crops.
4. Caveats
We assume that there is no discounting and/or loss of market access abroad for other
foodproductsbecauseofwhatGMadoptiondoesforacountry’sgenericreputationas
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a producer of ‘clean, green and safe food’. This understates the gains to New Zealand
of staying GM-free because if Australia were to allow GM adoption then the demand
for food products, in general, from New Zealand may increase at Australia’s expense
insofar as the two countries are currently seen as close alternative suppliers of ‘clean,
green and safe food’ (and vice versa for Australia if only New Zealand were to adopt).
We assume too that there is no need for SIP through the supply chain to allow
consumers to choose between foods with and without GMOs. This means we have
overstated the gains to ANZ from GM adoption at home because, given the strict
labelling legislation introduced by both countries earlier this decade, a SIP system
for domestic crops would have to be used if GM varieties were to be grown lo-
cally. However, with SIP cost estimates varying from close to zero to as much as
15percent of the crop value, it is not yet possible to judge the extent of that possible
overestimation (althought the study by Wilson and Dahl (2005) suggests it is small).
We have ignored the owners of intellectual property in GM varieties, and sim-
ply assumed the productivity advantage of GM varieties is net of the higher cost
of GM seeds. If that intellectual property is held by a ﬁrm in a country other than
the GM-adopting country, then the gain from adoption is overstated in the adopting
country and understated for the home countries of the relevant multinational biotech
companies.
Consumer welfare depends on the imagined risk associated with consuming foods
that may contain GMOs. A start to modelling this endogenous market failure associ-
ated with the introduction of a GM variety is provided by Lapan and Moschini (2004)
using a partial equilibrium two-country model, but in our CGE model we have no way
of evaluating what that loss of welfare would be when GM products are allowed to be
sold in a market.
To date it appears there is no scientiﬁc evidence that GM food is unsafe (King
2003), and there is evidence from experimental economics to suggest consumers are
lessinclinedtodiscountGMfoodswhengivenmoreinformationabouttherisks(Lusk
etal. 2004). Nonetheless, the estimated welfare costs of the EU or ANZ moratoria are
overstated to the extent that EU consumers value the knowledge that they have not
been consuming food that may contain GMOs.
Likewise, although Wesseler (2005) recently assessed the potential environmental
beneﬁts and costs of GM varieties, we do not have enough knowledge of the potential
positive and negative effects to incorporate them into our simulation model. As with
food safety, though, it would in any case not be sufﬁcient to include them only for
GM varieties; they would also need to be included for non-GM varieties to ensure
even-handedness.
Thetechnologyshocksinoursimulationsassumeauniformincreaseinproductivity
of all factors used in GM crop production. We use that assumption because it turns
out to make little difference to the welfare results when it is changed to allow some
factors to be saved more than others or some intermediate inputs such as pesticides to
be needed less by GM crop varieties.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above comparative static modelling
assumes GM technology delivers a one-off increase in farm productivity for that
portion of a crop’s area planted to the GM varieties. But what is more likely is that,
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once the GM crops are accepted, there would be an increase in the rate of agricultural
productivity growth into the future and adoption rates would rise, so that the present
value of future returns from GM adoption may be several times those implied by the
numbers shown above. Also dampened by the EU policy stance has been investment
in second-generation GM crop varieties that promise enhanced consumer attributes,
such as vitamin-enrichment. Recent analysis suggests the consequent welfare beneﬁts
of such varieties could well dwarf those evaluated above (Anderson etal. 2005).
5. Conclusions
The comparative advantages of Australia and New Zealand in various (GM and non-
GM)cropswillcontinuetochangenotonlybecauseofchangingconsumerattitudesat
homeandabroadbutalsoasANZ’stradingpartnersaltertheirconsumer,producerand
trade policies and as new (GM and non-GM) crop varieties appear. Evidently, plenty
of markets for GM crops exist, as the three ﬁrst GM-adopting countries – the USA,
Canada and Argentina – still account for high shares of global exports (80% for maize,
64% for soybean and 42% for canola in 2002). Even so, ANZ’s beneﬁts from adoption
dependontheextenttowhichGMproductsareacceptedbyconsumersathomeandby
ANZ’s current major trading partners, as well as on how well SIP is handled. For that
reason, recent debates over whether to approve GM canola production in Australia
suggest production is unlikely to be approved until a cost-effective SIP system is in
place to allow coexistence of non-GM and GM varieties (Lloyd 2003; Parliament of
South Australia 2003). Like New Zealand, all states of Australia (except Queensland)
continue to delay approval because they perceive insufﬁcient economic beneﬁt from
GM crops to warrant the cost of the necessary coexistence system (which will fall more
on non-GM producers, the smaller the share of GM varieties in total output), of the
expected loss that would result from a downgrading of their region’s status as a ‘clean,
green and safe food’ supplier domestically and abroad, and of insurance to cover the
risk of adventitious presence of GM varieties in non-GM crop shipments.
These cautious approaches are understandable while only maize and soybean were
ready for adoption, while consumer aversion remained high, and where SIP systems
were undeveloped. However, a ban on GM production may be less economically
desirable as and when these conditions change, at least for Australia. GM yield-
increasing varieties of canola suitable for Australian conditions are now available
and two herbicide-resistant ones were approved by the Ofﬁce of the Gene Technology
Regulator in 2004; and new GM wheat varieties also have been developed by CSIRO
that are tolerant to drought and some common pests (CSIRO 2003). Also, consumers
are showing more tolerance of GMOs where labelling laws are in place, particularly as
they learn of the prospects for building in attributes desired for health reasons. And
SIP systems are gradually becoming more common and cost-effective in response to
consumersseekingever-moreproductinformationingeneralonfoodlabels(andinthe
future on bar codes). Therefore, although the above analysis does not provide strong
reasons for removing current ANZ restrictions, the beneﬁt–cost calculus associated
with relaxing the moratoria on the commercial release of GM varieties will continue
to change over time and so needs to be kept under review.
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